Thursday, March 28, 2024

Moscow Moves to Strengthen Federal Districts, Another Sign It May Now Move to Abolish Non-Russian Republics

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 25 – Shortly after he became president, Vladimir Putin established seven federal districts to supervise the regions and republics within them. (In 2010, he added an eighth one, for the North Caucasus.) Many then saw that as a first step toward the abolishment of the more than 80 oblasts, krays and non-Russian republics.

            But these institutions have receded from public view, with many seeing them not as improving administration but rather getting in the way of other changes that might improve central control (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/04/deputy-prime-minister-wants-to-replace.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/03/a-russia-of-agglomerations-would-be.html).

            Moreover, while Putin clearly believed that they would prevent the disintegration of the Russian Federation, others warned that a country with only seven or eight units was more likely to fall apart than one with more than 80 (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/11/federal-districts-intended-to-stop.html).

            But now after Putin’s “re-election” and the terrorist attack in Moscow, some are suggesting the Kremlin leader will now seek to abolish non-Russian republics and may use the federal districts as a means to that end (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/03/before-end-of-2024-putin-will-abolish.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/03/putin-likely-to-exploit-terror-attack.html).

            Evidence for that conclusion is provided by a meeting Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin had with the deputy heads of the federal districts and his outlining of a work plan for them for the coming year (realtribune.ru/mishustin-dal-porucheniya-po-dalnejshej-rabote-instituta-kuratorstva-federalnyh-okrugov/).

            That plan calls for them to develop action programs for the federal subjects in their respective districts which after Moscow’s approval, they will oversee the implementation of. Such a program strongly suggests that the role of the federal subjects in the regions and republics will now increase, exactly what one might expect if Moscow plans to abolish the latter.

Concentration of Population in Minsk Agglomeration has Reduced Powers of Belarusian Regions

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 25 – Belarus is following a pattern typical of Russia and other former Soviet states: its population and their economic activity is increasingly concentrated in the capital city and the urban agglomeration around it, a trend that has strengthened the central government and weakened the influence of the regions, Anastasiya Gurina says.

            Many analysts suggest that the strengthening of central governments and the weakening of regional ones is the result of the policies of national leaders. There is much truth in that. But the Belarusians and the Market analyst says that deeper demographic and economic factors are at work or at least are assisting the centralizers (belmarket.by/news/news-56192.html).

            In 1990, only one Belarusian in six lived in the capital; but today, 38 percent live in the agglomeration, 22 percent in the city itself and 16 percent more in its suburban areas. And together they form 38 percent of the population of the country as a whole. And economically, this center is even more important: 42 percent of all Belarusians work there.

            As a result, the regions have become relatively less important; and any effort to reverse this trend, one that inevitably promotes the centralization not only of economic but political activity, will be extremely difficult, something that many regionalists fail to recognize and take into account in their programs.

            Just changing leaders from those who want to centralize to those who favor federalization and decentralization will unlikely be enough if the underlying demographic and economic situations are not addressed. If they aren’t, centralization is likely to continue not only demographically and economically but politically as well.

Since Putin Came to Power, Moscow’s Military Spending has Risen Seven Times More than Inflation and Become a Major Driver of Price Rises, Analysis Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 25 – Between the end of 1999 when Vladimir Putin came to power and today, Moscow’s spending on the military has increased 65.2 times, a major reason that inflation has officially risen over the same period by 8.94 times and much more according to unofficial accounts over the same period, Ilya Reykh says.

             The Russian commentator says that this means that Russians are paying twice for Putin’s military expansion, first with their taxes which are slated to rise again and then by the higher prices they are compelled to pay for all goods and services (svoboda.org/a/voyna-po-predoplate-voennye-rashody-razgonyayut-inflyatsiyu-v-rossii/32870008.html).

            Russians are accustomed to Moscow blaming oil prices, Western sanctions, and other factors for inflation; but analysis shows, Reykh says, that the radical increases in military spending over the period of Putin’s rule have played a major role and represents yet another burden he has placed on the Russian population.

            In his article, the Russian economist uses Russian government and foreign government data and shows why many of the most widely accepted explanations for inflation in Russia are at a minimum insufficient and why at the same time military spending in an economy like the Russian one inevitably plays a larger role.

            What that means, he concludes, is that if Putin continues to boost spending on the military, inflation in Russia will rise, putting ever larger burdens on the Russian population, burdens the people will feel but may not blame on military spending unless they pay close attention to the various factors at work.

FSB Focusing on Exile Tatarstan Government – and Bringing It to the Attention of More People

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 25 – Two telegram channels controlled by the FSB, OBKHSS and Political Commander of Tatarstan, are publishing article that seek to discredit the Government of Independent Tatarstan in Exile, Aida Abdrakhmanova, the deputy prime minister of that regime, says.   

            She provides a translation of one of these articles, which, as she notes, represents a tendentious pastiche of publicly available information (tatar-toz.blogspot.com/2024/03/blog-post_25.html and abn.org.ua/en/documents/the-russian-fsb-is-interested-in-the-government-of-independent-tatarstan-in-exile/):

About the so-called “government of Tatarstan in exile.”

This structure emerged with the support of Western and Turkish intelligence at the end of 2008. By that time, Tatar separatism in the republic had been fairly suppressed, but its most odious representatives were still active. Among them, the most famous were the odious Tatar writer, Russophobe and extremist Fauziya Bayramova (later twice involved in criminal cases), as well as extremists and criminals, the Kashapov brothers, including the current head of the “government of Tatarstan in exile” Rafis Kashapov.

In December 2008, 25 representatives of the so-called gathered in Naberezhnye Chelny. “Milli Majlis” is an unregistered organization created in early 1992 and claiming to be the Tatar “national parliament”. Among the participants in this gathering were Tatar nationalist extremists known since the 1990s, including Zinnur Agliullin, Talgat Akhmadishin, and Damir Shaikhutdinov. But the main one was Vil Mirzayanov, who connected to the event from the USA via the Internet.

Who is Vil Mirzayanov? He is a chemical scientist who in the early 1990s revealed Russian military secrets to which he had access since Soviet times. He was convicted, but under American pressure, he was released. In 1995, Mirzayanov emigrated to the United States and since then has actively worked under the leadership of the CIA in programs aimed at provoking interethnic splits and separatism in Russia. Being an ethnic Tatar, Mirzayanov became the main conductor of the interests of Tatar separatists in the United States. In 2001–2002, he visited Tatarstan, after which he was accused of espionage and expelled from Russia, barred from entering our country.

The resuscitation of the Milli Majlis in December 2008 was preceded by a meeting between Vil Mirzayanov and Fauzia Bayramova in October of the same year in Germany. It was then that the main decisions of the future gathering were discussed, including the creation of the so-called. “national government”, which, at the instigation of Mirzayanov, included several foreigners with Tatar roots, including journalist H. Kulechyuz (Germany), historian Iklil Kurban, writer Rosa Kurban (Turkey). Among the “ministers” of the “government” was also Bayramova’s daughter, political scientist Zulfiya Kadyr, who has been living abroad for a long time.

The “Government of Tatarstan in Exile” was created following a meeting of the Milli Majlis in December 2008 in Naberezhnye Chelny. Vil Mirzayanov became its chairman. That is, from the very beginning, this “government” intended to be abroad to become the coordinator of provoking Tatar separatism within Russia. This activity was supposed to be financed by the CIA, which Vil Mirzayanov was especially interested in (his salary as a professor at Princeton was no longer enough for him).

Mirzayanov was the head of the “government” until February 2023, after which he was replaced by the even more famous extremist Rafis Kashapov.

Rafis Kashapov, together with his brothers, came to the Tatar national movement from the criminal environment of the 1990s, having made a fortune in the alcohol trade. This money financed numerous nationalist covens, as well as support for Chechen separatists during the time of Aslan Maskhadov. By the way, the sale of alcohol did not prevent the Kashapov brothers from positioning themselves as “devout Muslims.” During his illegal political activities in Russia, Rafis Kashapov was convicted four times on extremist charges. After serving his sentence, he went to Ukraine in 2017, and in 2018 settled in London, where he was captured by one of the British secret intelligence services.

The transfer of the leadership of the “government of Tatarstan in exile” into the hands of Kashapov in 2023 suggests that it is British intelligence that is taking control of the activities of the Tatar separatists, integrating them into the mainstream of supporting the Bandera regime in Ukraine. This means that we should not exclude the threat of sabotage and terrorist activity in the republic, given that there are sympathizers of the Bandera regime in Tatarstan.

Most countries have little time for governments in exile even if they support the positions those governments maintain. But Russia is an exception: it is obsessed with such organizations, likely because of the way in which the Bolshevik emigration came from nowhere at the start of 1917 to rule the country by the end of that year.

But by choosing to go after such institutions via propaganda campaigns, Moscow is doing more to bring the existence and activities of such groups to far larger numbers of people than these groups could hope for on their own.   

Instead of Restoring the Death Penalty, Putin Regime May Start Cutting Off Ears of Criminals, Some Russians Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 25 – Having seen the pictures of the man the FSB arrested for terrorism at Crocus Hall with his ear cut off, some Russians are now speculating that the Kremlin may decide not to restore the death penalty but rather make this alternative form of punishment available for other kinds of crimes as well.

            This is only one of the anecdotes Russians are now telling each other that have been collected by Moscow journalist Tatyana Pushkaryova (publizist.ru/blogs/107374/48089/-). Among the best of the rest are the following:

·       The Crocus Hall terrorists did everything they could to get caught, allowing their car to be photographed, going away as a group, and taking public roads to “Ukraine, the homeland of the Tajiks. This all means that Moscow can now safely introduce martial law and declare mass mobilization.

·       Putin says the terrorists were headed toward Ukraine where Ukrainian border guards had opened “a window” for them. That raises the question: doesn’t Russia have any border guards there?

·       After the latest terrorist attack, no one changed their behavior in the slightest. Russians are now used to such things.

·       How is a Tajik sent to Moscow to kill Russians for 500,000 rubles any different from a Russian paid the same amount to go to Ukraine and kill Ukrainians?

·       Russians are no longer interested in hearing about Ukraine’s links with Nazism. So the Kremlin is now saying that “Ukraine is a Nazi Islamist state with a Jewish president.” That should mobilize the patriots again.

·       Putin likes to be known as unpredictable. If he really wants to continue to be viewed as such, why doesn’t he end the war in Ukraine?

 

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

Restoring Death Penalty Won’t Deter Terrorists but Will Further Degrade Russia, Shlosberg Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 24 – The restoration of the death penalty in Russia, something that would require constitutional change, won’t do anything to prevent future terrorist attacks but will further degrade Russian society, leading the state and the population to believe that they can take such actions against anyone they don’t like, Lev Shlosberg says.

            The opposition politician says that calls for the restoration of the death penalty are an inevitable form of populism in the wake of terrorist attacks, but those who make them don’t understand that terrorists ready to sacrifice themselves won’t be deterred and that if the state uses such violence, many in the population will conclude they have the right to do the same.

            That means that these calls may be part of a larger Kremlin effort to do away with the remaining fig leaf of democracy in Russia and turn it into an ever more violent dictatorship, Shlosberg says (t.me/shlosberg/7979 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/vozvrashhenie-smertnoj-kazni-dlya-terroristov-neizbezhno-privedyot-k-eyo-vozvrashheniyu-protiv-inakomyslyashhih).

            Tragically, he concludes, “there are quite a large number of people in Russia who want to open such gates to hell without completely understanding that these gates will open for everyone without exception.”

Mass Departure of Central Asians from Russia will Destabilize Their Homelands and Then Russia as Well, El Murid Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 24 – Any massive return of Central Asian migrant workers from Russia to their homelands will in the short term destabilize these authoritarian states and then in the longer term the instability they will create in that region will spread back into Russia itself, according to Anatoly Nesmiyan, who blogs under the screen name El Murid.

            The only way the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia have been able to maintain “relative stability”  is for them to have dispatched, mostly to Russia, the young men who helped power the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the blogger says (telegra.ph/Posledstviya-03-24-6 reposted at https://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6601156C1AD42).

            But now there is a danger that many of the Central Asians, faced with a rising tide of xenophobia in Russia, will return home and produce exactly the same kind of instability there that such cohorts produced elsewhere. That won’t end the situation, however, El Murid continues.

            Instead, instability in Central Asia will lead to a flow back into Russia of this group of people; and inflamed both by war and their own experiences with xenophobia and repression, this second wave of Central Asians will destabilize Russia itself quite possibly under the banner of radical jihadist ideology.

            What that means, of course, is that those Russians who want Central Asians to go home are buying only a temporary respite from the threat to Russia and may in the process be unwittingly creating an even more dangerous enemy than the one that they now face, El Murid concludes.